The Culturally-Inflected Imagination

A post by Alfredo Vernazzani

The imagination has long been regarded with ambivalence in science and philosophy. In Renaissance, and later until the 18th century, it was even conjectured that it could alter the course of normal biological development, and generate monsters. Scientists such as the physician Fienus (1608), and philosophers like Malebranche (1660/1871) speculated that the mother’s imagination could have such deep effects as to alter the fetus’ development, a doctrine called by its opponents ‘imaginationism’ (Dürbeck 1998). Whereas imaginationism populates the Wunderkammer of the history of science, contemporary philosophers wrestle with epistemic hurdles regarding the uses of the imagination (e.g. Myers 2023).

Recourse to the imagination, for example in thought experiments, can lead to uncertain philosophical speculations, give us the illusion of epistemic insight, or paralyze reflection into the labyrinths of phantasy. Arguably, the mistrust towards the imagination is at least partially fueled by its apparent freedom. Let me make a comparison with another constructive process, such as visual perception. To assemble visual representations of our surroundings, the visual system operates under several constraints, such as feature-object binding (Matthen 2005; Vernazzani 2022), Gestalt principles (Koffka 1936; Wagemans et al. 2015), and so on. But the imagination doesn’t operate in the same way, for we seem to be able to imagine whatever we want. In this respect, Hume’s words seem particularly apposite: “[n]othing is more free than the imagination of man” (1748/2009, p. 39). Hence the question: under what conditions does the exercise of the imagination improve our epistemic standing?

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