A post by Andrea Rivadulla Duró

We spend a fair amount of time imagining experiences and do so nonchalantly. Take Mary, for example, who works as a security guard in a government building where the hours stretch long and monotonous. As she stands immovable as a pin, she watches the day's traffic ebb and flow for eight hours a day. Her aspirations for a brighter future are dim, compelling her to retreat into imagination during working hours. In her daydream, she imagines herself as a pianist, hearing the resounding applause of an audience, feeling the weight of a trophy in her hands, and basking in the glow of faces of recognition.

It is well established that Mary’s imagining can evoke emotions akin to those experienced during actual events (Holmes & Matheus, 2010). As Mary imagines, she might momentarily feel joy. Nevertheless, setting aside these immediate emotional responses, imagining is typically considered harmless from a long-term perspective. Mary is aware that her imagined episode does not track changes in the world (i.e. it lacks world-sensitivity; Badura & Kind, 2021). Consequently, Mary will not attribute evidential value to the imagined, nor will she adjust her attitudes based on it.

In the philosophical literature, perception is characterized as having assertoric force: It inclines the perceiver to believe its content (Chasid & Weksler, 2020). In contrast, perceptual imagination is commonly taken to be non-assertoric: Imagining winning a piano contest does not incline the imaginer to believe they actually won.