A post by Joanna Ahlberg.

In the past twenty years or so, we have seen an increasing interest in a type of image-free imagination commonly referred to as Propositional Imagination. When we propositionally imagine, we imagine that a state of affairs obtains such as “imagining-that velociraptors invade the university library.” In so doing, the content of our imagining, or the representation used in our imagining, is understood to be a proposition rather than an image. ...  It is often, but not always conceptually juxtaposed with Sensory or Objectual imagination (Kind, 2016; Debus, 2016; Wiltsher 2012; et al). Unlike propositional imagination, sensory imagination takes imagery as its content; images, not propositions represent what we are imagining, and therefore “fix” the content of our imaginative thought. ... What I’m about to put pressure on is the idea that sensory imagination is non-propositional – or at least that mental images, specifically visual mental images, do not represent propositionally. I think that they do. In fact, I think that visual mental images are loaded with propositional content, and if the content of a sensorily imagined thought is a visual mental image, it follows naturally that sensory imagination is more propositionally contentful than initially thought – in some cases, even more so than so-called propositional imagination.