A post by Kengo Miyazono.

Normally we have no difficulty in distinguishing what we believe from what we imagine. We seem to have a reliable metacognitive capacity that enables us to distinguish our beliefs from our imaginings. I can easily judge that “the university library is closed today” is something I believe and that “I am the best football player in the world” is something I imagine. But how exactly do I do this? How exactly do I distinguish beliefs from imaginings?

A post by Kengo Miyazono.

Philosophical discussion of truth-in-fiction begins with the observation that what is true-in-fiction cannot simply be identified with what is explicitly stated in the fictional text. For example, being explicitly stated is not necessary for being true-in-fiction. It is not explicitly stated in the texts of Sherlock Holmes stories that Holmes livers nearer to Paddington Station than Waterloo Station, but it is true-in-Holmes. (What is explicitly stated is that Holmes lives in Baker Street.) In this post, however, I discuss another issue which is less frequently discussed; being explicitly stated in the text is not sufficient for being true-in-fiction.